


#120

31 Oct 2001

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



*Air University*

*Air War College*

*Maxwell AFB, Alabama*

*Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.*

*Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at [www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm) for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt Col Michael W. Ritz, ANG Special Assistant to Director of CPC or Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy.*

*The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved*

## CONTENTS

[Spores Shut 2 More Area Post Offices](#)

[N.Y. Worker's Anthrax Deepens Mystery](#)

[Pentagon Seeks Tinkerers Against Terrorism](#)

[Missile Defense: Now More Than Ever](#)

[Homeland Security Director Learning Job Under Spotlight](#)

[Defense Department Accelerates Several ACTD Programs: Focus On Hard Targets](#)

[Bush's Deferral Of Anti-Missile Tests Buys Time For ABM Treaty Workaround](#)

[Lawmakers Look To Expand Role Of VA In U.S. Disasters](#)

[Hill Mail Still Untested 2 Weeks After Daschle Letter](#)

[U.S. Seeks Anthrax Vaccine For Almost 1 Million People](#)

[Secret Desert Project On Anthrax](#)

[Chasing Bioterror Around Beltway, From The Senate To The C.I.A.](#)

[Nuclear Attack A Real, If Remote, Possibility](#)

[ABM ABC's](#)

[Officials Wary About Soviet Arsenal](#)

[Russian parliament votes on destruction of chemical weapons](#)

[Drugmakers Step Forward in Bioterror Fight](#)

[Austria Tests Possible Anthrax Disinfectant Spray](#)

[New York City Hospital Worker Dies](#)

## **Spores Shut 2 More Area Post Offices** ***Letters Headed To U.S. Agencies To Be Irradiated***

By Carol Morello and Justin Blum, Washington Post Staff Writers

The scope of the anthrax outbreak continued to widen yesterday as two more Washington area post offices were closed by positive tests for the deadly bacteria, and postal officials said all mail destined for Congress, the White House and federal agencies would be sanitized before delivery.

The contamination detected at the Friendship post office in Northwest Washington and a small branch office near Dulles International Airport in Loudoun County brings to three the number of tainted neighborhood post offices. Anthrax spores were discovered at the Southwest branch on L Street last week. Authorities said that employees should continue taking antibiotics but that customers who visited the buildings do not need treatment.

"The post offices that have been tested are almost uniformly negative, and the ones that are positive have very, very low levels of contamination," said Patrick J. Meehan, director of emergency and environmental health services for the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Even as two cases of inhalation anthrax were reported in New York and New Jersey, health officials in Washington expressed relief that no new cases had been diagnosed in the region this week.

D.C. Mayor Anthony A. Williams (D) said federal and local health officials have built a "firebreak around the problem."

The closing of the Friendship branch office made already inconsistent mail delivery in the District even more spotty yesterday. Service was disrupted in the 20007, 20008 and 20016 Zip codes, postal officials said, and they could not even characterize service in the rest of the city. When Brentwood closed Oct. 21, all the mail in the city's main processing and distribution facility was locked in, said Jerry Lane, the Washington area postal manager. Officials are sanitizing that mail and planning to deliver it, he said.

Authorities are still awaiting the results of environmental testing at eight post offices that receive mail from Brentwood. Thirty-two post offices tested negative for anthrax spores. Tests are incomplete at five locations.

Two postal workers from the Brentwood facility in Northeast Washington -- which processed an anthrax-tainted letter sent this month to Senate Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) -- have died. Three other inhalation anthrax victims were in stable condition at hospitals in Falls Church and Winchester.

At the Friendship branch, 4005 Wisconsin Ave. NW, spores were discovered on the second floor in a back room away from public areas. The CDC said only one of 16 samples from the second floor tested positive.

The other facility where test results showed a "negligible" amount of anthrax in a back room was a five-employee storefront operation at 45005 Aviation Dr. in Loudoun. Although it is in Virginia, the post office receives mail directly from Brentwood.

A decontamination crew hired by the Postal Service set off a building alarm at 4:30 a.m. yesterday when the results became known. That is how Michael G. Ferrier, chief executive of Airline Tariff Publishing Co., which owns the building and shares it with the post office, learned of the contamination. He said the CDC told him that his 480 employees are not in danger.

"They determined that the amount found was so small that there was no risk outside the work surfaces," Ferrier said. After days of analysis, CDC officials have decided to extend the antibiotic treatment of postal workers from the Brentwood mail-processing facility. As many as 3,000 people who worked at or visited Brentwood will be given 50-day supplies of doxycycline when their 10-day supply of Cipro runs out. Officials said the facility's anthrax spore contamination was "widespread."

In addition to those at Brentwood, postal workers at the three branch locations that tested positive for anthrax spores should extend their treatment to 60 days to suppress infection, which experts think can occur as long as 45 days after exposure.

City officials also were urging mailroom employees of as many as 4,000 businesses and institutions that receive bulk mail from Brentwood to immediately begin antibiotic treatment.

That recommendation includes an unknown number of postal customers outside the District who receive unsorted mail in bundles from Brentwood.

"If you take the medicine, you won't get sick," said D.C. Health Department Director Ivan C.A. Walks.

Many private mail handlers still do not know they are included in the advisory. Few of their employers have done environmental testing. CDC officials said they hope to release guidelines soon advising private employers what to do.

Workers at the 32 neighborhood post offices that tested negative for anthrax spores were told yesterday they can discontinue antibiotics. That group includes Williams and his mother, who both started treatment because they had visited the Brookland and Congress Heights post offices.

The ongoing environmental tests and the need to irradiate much of the mail continues to cause disruptions in service. Among the agencies affected are the FBI and the U.S. attorney's office, both of which are playing roles in the anthrax investigation. Even outgoing mail is being limited, so court documents are being hand-delivered, e-mailed, faxed or sent by express services.

Delays may become routine. Postmaster General John E. Potter said yesterday that irradiation will be used on all mail sent to federal government agencies and institutions.

About 1 million pieces of mail already have been trucked out for irradiation by a private firm, Titan Scan, of Lima, Ohio. The mail is placed in two sealed bags and then a box before being placed on a FedEx truck.

The first truckloads already have returned from Lima. But Potter and Chief Postal Inspector Kenneth Weaver said the sanitized mail will be sorted, "piece by piece," in a secure facility -- they declined to divulge where -- to look for any letters similar to the one sent to Daschle. "It could be weeks" before all that mail is sorted through, Weaver said. Bulk mail, such as magazines, will not be sanitized, and some of it could be delivered to Congress as early as today. In what has become a pattern, many of the messages sent to federal employees and postal workers yesterday seemed contradictory.

At a town hall-like meeting at the State Department, Cedric Dumont, head of the department's medical unit, said anthrax spores are "probably all over" the building but not in concentrations strong enough to cause anthrax by inhalation.

Although State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said Monday there was no evidence that anthrax spores had spread beyond two mailrooms where they were discovered, some employees expressed skepticism and concern.

"Your office areas probably have some contamination," Dumont said. "We've got envelopes probably throughout the system that may have very few . . . spores on them."

The confusion has angered postal workers to the point that some union officials are talking about a job action.

Union officials in New Jersey and New York say privately that they expect the president of the American Postal Workers Union, William Burrus, to announce a job action in areas affected by anthrax at a news conference tomorrow in Washington.

At D.C. General Hospital, workers for various government agencies reported, as they were told to do by their supervisors, for evaluation and drugs. All had some connection to the mail in their offices. But they ended up being turned away.

Numerous employees of the U.S. Patent Office, the Department of Labor and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, among others, waited as long as three hours to enter the hospital.

Once inside, they learned that, at least at that moment, only Brentwood employees were being given antibiotics. How were they treated?

"On a scale of 1 to 10? A 2, and that's being nice," said Antoinette McCoy, who stood with three other employees of the trading commission on the grass outside the hospital.

They did come away with something, however. Each got a pamphlet on dealing with anxiety.

*Staff writers Steven Ginsberg, Avram Goldstein, Carol D. Leonnig, Steven Mufson, Ellen Nakashima and Steve Twomey contributed to this report.*

Washington Post

October 31, 2001

Pg. 1

## **N.Y. Worker's Anthrax Deepens Mystery**

By Michael Powell and Ceci Connolly, Washington Post Staff Writers

NEW YORK -- Public health officials found themselves baffled yesterday as deadly anthrax spores spread beyond the realm of postal workers, politicians and the news media, raising new concerns about where the disease is coming from and how it is being delivered.

The latest victim was a 61-year-old female hospital worker in New York City who has been diagnosed with pulmonary anthrax and was clinging yesterday to life on a respirator.

Hers was the second case made public in two days to involve Americans who handle mail only incidentally on their job: On Monday, New Jersey officials disclosed that a bookkeeper for an accounting firm had been diagnosed with skin anthrax.

Steven Ostroff, who is the lead Centers for Disease Control and Prevention official in New York, said that the latest cases fit no pattern that health officials have seen with other anthrax infections. "There is no clear linkage with the mail," he said. "We don't suppose that we know what the source was."

CDC director Jeffrey Koplan was no less confounded. "Your guesses," he told reporters in a conference call from Atlanta, "are as good as mine."

News of the latest cases has reinforced how little health and law enforcement officials know about how people become infected and the likelihood of cross-contamination from mail laden with anthrax spores. Until the two women fell ill, health investigators had assumed -- and hoped -- that a half dozen or so infected letters were spreading the spores.

But as the hospital worker lies gravely ill, and the bookkeeper recuperates at home from an infection that began with a swollen lesion on her forehead, officials have revised their assumptions and are pursuing several theories at the same time.

Several public health and bioterrorism experts raised the possibility that terrorists -- whether domestic or foreign -- have switched to a new delivery system. The mystery, in this view, might have less to do with the anthrax bacteria than with the criminals who spread it.

"We shouldn't assume they're going to continue to do this in the same way," said David Walker, an infectious-disease specialist at the University of Texas medical branch at Galveston. "If they have a good supply of these spores they can distribute them in a lot of different ways. To focus on the mail . . . may not follow the way they're thinking."

Michael Osterholm, director of the University of Minnesota's center for infectious disease research and policy, made a similar point. "Letters may not be the only vehicle by which anthrax can be transmitted to a population," he said. "We have to keep an open mind."

If terrorists have enough of the finely milled spores that are most likely to cause pulmonary anthrax, Osterholm said, they could try a means of dissemination far more deadly than the mail, which has sickened relatively few people.

"They have a high quality bullet," he said, "but they're delivering it with a very ineffective gun."

Some speculate that anthrax bacteria could move more easily than previously thought. Others say that the supply of finely milled spores could be greater than originally estimated, and that criminals may have loaded and mailed multiple letters.

What is clear is that the new cases have confounded federal, state and city public health officials. In New York, 100 public and private hospitals remain on alert, monitoring emergency calls and admissions for patterns or clusters. The city health department has instructed hospitals to profile patients by symptoms and occupation. Hospitals are giving chest X-rays and blood tests, and prescribing antibiotics, for anyone from a post office, high-visibility corporation or news company who walks in showing symptoms of the flu or a bad cold.

Meanwhile, officials scrambled to care for the newly infected.

They described the latest victim as a Vietnamese immigrant who lives alone in the Bronx, without any close family. She works in the sterile supply room -- which is next to the mailroom -- at Manhattan Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital. Investigators have, as yet, found no trace of the disease at the hospital.

She fell ill last Thursday, running a fever and complaining of muscle aches. Co-workers said she worked through it, and came to work the next day as well, though she wore a coat to stay warm.

"She didn't look like herself," said Hattie R. O'Neal, who works in the hospital's admitting department. "She's always jovial and happy."

On Sunday, she began having trouble breathing, and walked into the emergency room at Lenox Hill Hospital, on Manhattan's Upper East Side. Staff started her on antibiotics but the disease was spreading rapidly. "There is evidence the spores have released a lot of toxins," said city Health Commissioner Neal L. Cohen.

Investigators cannot talk to the woman, who is heavily sedated and breathing with the help of a respirator. Officials temporarily closed the small, 28-bed hospital, transferring the four patients to other hospitals. They anticipate testing some employees and prescribing antibiotics for about 5,500 employees and patients -- approximately the number of people who would have walked into the hospital during the past 14 days, which is the typical incubation period for inhalational anthrax.

"There's no question there's a possibility she got it somewhere else," Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani said yesterday.

The New Jersey case is also perplexing. State officials there disclosed Monday that a bookkeeper for a small central New Jersey accounting firm had a lesion on her forehead that was diagnosed as skin anthrax. She was released from the hospital last Saturday.

Authorities said they have no clues about the source of her infection, and no reason to think she was exposed in her workplace. And their inspection of her workplace in Mercerville, the accounting firm of Civale, Silvestri and Alfieri, was noticeably relaxed, and contrasted with precautions that officials have taken in other cases.

To the surprise of tenants in her office complex -- and to the disappointment of television crews expecting men in moon suits -- inspection teams wore street clothes rather than hazardous-materials gear while taking environmental samples.

By afternoon, officials had allowed everyone to return, even though test results for the possible presence of anthrax spores are not expected for several days.

"It was expressed to us that they'd be surprised if they found anthrax in this office," said Nick Manetto, spokesman for Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.), whose district office is in the same complex. The building is about a five-minute drive from the Hamilton Township mail processing center, where three letters containing anthrax spores were postmarked.

FBI agents, as well as CDC staffers and state health department officials, all came to the woman's office and home today. But FBI spokeswoman Sandra Carroll cautioned against assuming there were any suspects.

The newly uncertain tone in remarks from health officials marked a shift from just four days ago, when CDC director Koplan expressed a belief that a second contaminated letter had moved through the postal system and infected a State Department worker who remains hospitalized with the pulmonary form of the disease. It was, Koplan said at that time, "unlikely to virtually impossible" that an individual could develop inhalation anthrax from spores that spread from one piece of mail to another.

Still, many public health leaders stood by Koplan's original hypothesis. The rationale is part microbiology and part physics, they said. Opening or jostling a letter can force the anthrax spores into the air, where they can be inhaled. Studies suggest that 2,000 to 10,000 spores must lodge deep inside the lungs to cause the pulmonary form of the disease.

But once anthrax spores settle on a surface, it's unlikely the bacteria will aerosolize -- or float -- a second time, said Neil Fishman, director of the antimicrobial management program at the University of Pennsylvania.

That led Fishman to suspect the hospital worker in New York suffered "a more direct attack."

For now, CDC's "medical detectives" -- a cadre of epidemiologists and lab workers -- have descended on New York and New Jersey hunting for clues. Much of the investigation, Koplan said, involves old-fashioned shoe leather: interviewing patients, co-workers, friends and family, attempting to trace the source of contamination.

But Koplan acknowledged there is an enormous gap in scientists' understanding of the bacteria.

"We know that if you have a large number of these spores, whether it's 5,000 or 10,000 or 50,000, that they clearly pose significant human danger," he said. "And I think we can be pretty assured that if you have 1 or 2 or 5 or 10 spores, that they pose very little danger. It's what's in between," he said, that remains unclear.

Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson, who has adopted an air of confidence in handling the outbreak, acknowledged new uncertainties yesterday.

"Before we discuss what we know, I want to remind everyone that this information we have is what we know at this time," he said in opening remarks. "Information is developing that will likely alter these facts . . . because this is an ongoing investigation."

*Staff writers Rick Weiss, Dale Russakoff and Christine Haughney contributed to this report.*

Washington Post  
October 31, 2001  
Pg. C1

## **Pentagon Seeks Tinkerers Against Terrorism**

By Richard Leiby, Washington Post Staff Writer

In peacetime, the press release might have passed without much notice. "Pentagon Seeks Ideas on Combating Terrorism," it said. Please submit a one-page description of your idea to the Department of Defense by Dec. 23.

But as a jittery populace watches a weird new war unfold, perhaps it isn't the most reassuring announcement to emanate from the Pentagon: Help. Specifically, the military wants to know about technologies that might assist U.S. troops hunting for terrorists hiding in caves -- or, as the press release put it, "conducting protracted operations in remote areas."

It turns out you can do more to help Uncle Sam than remaining calm and going shopping.

"We've got a new kind of problem here, so if anyone's got good ideas, that can be helpful," notes James Kurtz, a researcher at the Institute for Defense Analyses who spent 32 years in the Army. "They're looking for the guy in the basement of the high school science building who's got a new idea. Nobody has a lock on all good ideas."

The Pentagon, as reported last week, is seeking anti-terrorist "concepts" in 38 categories, including "countermeasures to weapons of mass destruction." These might include, say, air samplers to sniff out germ agents, sensors to detect small nuclear devices and gizmos to identify truck bombs.

The announcement left some defense observers puzzled. "You read that list and wonder: What have they been doing?" asks Ralph Peters, a retired Army lieutenant colonel and author of "Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?"

Perhaps, in the midst of increasingly dire pronouncements about "credible" terrorist threats, you have personally felt confused, helpless and driven to drink. Well, buck up: Haven't you heard there's a war on? It's time to put on your thinking cap and repair to the workbench in your garage.

Visit the Web site [www.bids.tswg.gov](http://www.bids.tswg.gov) and pick a category. Got an idea for "lightweight personal armor that stops both weapons and knife penetration with full body protection"? Fire away. Are you handy with cameras? "Develop high-fidelity through-wall imaging capability." Let's see those terrorists hide from American X-ray vision.

"Unconventional surveillance and reconnaissance systems are desired," the Pentagon says. Especially one to "detect, locate and map underground/concealed cavities that may serve as secure havens for terrorists."

Your ideas can help protect the homeland, too. "Develop a deception detection device for use with counterterrorism-based structured interviews for passengers in various modes of transportation," the Pentagon requests. In other words, a portable lie detector. Finally, ticket agents will have a way to verify the answers to those important questions, "Have you had your luggage in your possession at all times? Has anyone unknown to you asked you to carry anything on board?"

If Messrs. Hewlett and Packard could launch a high-tech behemoth from a garage, then why can't you invent an algorithm-based software that can identify and analyze voices -- specifically to "incorporate Pashtu, Urdu, Farsi, Arabic dialects, and other minor Middle Eastern and central/south Asian languages into an existing Automated Speaker Recognition System" that can be used by "selected intelligence and counterintelligence agencies"?

The Department of Defense says it wants concepts that can be "developed and fielded" in 12 to 18 months. Pentagon officials express confidence that the call for ideas will produce rapid results, given the ingenuity of Americans.

"We're trying to find every possibility, to find everything to make us the best equipped and give our people the best protection, which they deserve," says Air Force Maj. Michael T. Halbig, a Pentagon spokesman. These new products, he says, will keep America "ahead of the bad guys."

Paul Taibl, assistant vice president for policy at the nonprofit Business Executives for National Security, applauds the Pentagon for casting a wide net for anti-terrorism tools. "I'd like to think that if anyone's got access to this technology, it ought to be the government, but that's no longer the case," he says. "The Department of Defense is not the technology leader that it was during the height of the Cold War."

In recent years, untold sums have been poured into studies by the Pentagon and various congressional commissions to identify terrorist threats, including a \$45 million brainstorming effort by Hollywood writers and directors under the Army's Simulation, Training and Instrumentation Command. But concrete solutions aren't so readily offered.

"Maybe somebody's got a better idea out there," Halbig says.

Remember to send in your idea by 4 p.m. Dec. 23. Better yet, beat the Christmas rush and get to the post office early. That is, if you can find a functioning post office . . .

Washington Times

October 31, 2001

Pg. 21

## **Missile Defense: Now More Than Ever**

By Joseph Perkins

Osama bin Laden has learned something from America's anthrax scare. No, not that we are a nation of Chicken Littles. And not that we do a pretty good job of scaring ourselves. But that the U.S. postal system is a decidedly inefficient delivery system for carrying out a biological attack against the American people.

Indeed, for all the current hysteria about anthrax, only three people have actually died from exposure to the bacteria since the first case was reported more than a month ago. It is likely that more Americans died from being struck by lightning over the same span.

So if al Qaeda or some other terror network aims to wage biological jihad against the United States — using anthrax, smallpox, botulin toxin or some other deadly bacteria or virus — it probably isn't going to waste time and effort writing poison-pen letters from some Trenton, N.J., apartment.

The same goes for chemical terror. Bin Laden's operatives here in the United States could, conceivably, place plastic bags of sarin, the lethal nerve agent, on New York or Washington subway trains during morning rush hour.

But Japan's Aum Shinrikyo terrorist cult already tried such a chemical attack in 1995. And of the tens of thousands of commuters on Tokyo's subway system who were exposed to the nerve gas, only 12 actually died.

The mass murderers responsible for the terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which claimed more than 5,000 innocent lives, are probably not going to be satisfied with taking three lives here, a dozen lives there.

They want to cause as many deaths as possible. And the best way to do that, using germs or chemicals, is through a weapon of mass destruction, such as a long-range missile carrying a biological or chemical (or even nuclear) payload that can be fired at the United States from, say, Afghanistan or Iraq.

Indeed, that is why it is even more imperative, in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, that the United States develop and deploy a national missile defense system as soon as possible. For our once-secure nation is in a life-or-death race with those who would lay waste to our cities and who would permanently disrupt the domestic tranquility we Americans have, until recently, taken for granted.

It is not a far stretch to suggest that the race to deploy a missile defense system before bin Laden or Saddam Hussein or some other sworn enemy of the United States gets hold of an ICBM is no less urgent than this nation's race to develop and deploy the atomic bomb before Adolf Hitler during World War II.

And it would be dangerously naive for lawmakers in Washington to think the United States has plenty of time to bring missile defense online, national security expert Richard Perle argued in a recent newspaper essay.

"While there is controversy about whether it will be three years or 10 years or some other time frame," wrote the former assistant secretary of defense, "there is no dispute that such countries as Iran, Iraq and North Korea will eventually get missiles with the range sufficient to attack us and our allies and the warheads of mass destruction — nuclear, biological and chemical — that could be delivered by them."

Indeed, as far back as 1997, the Clinton administration issued a National Security Council fact sheet detailing Iraq's program to develop both biological and chemical weapons. Baghdad admitted flight-testing long-range SCUD missiles with warheads designed for chemicals, including a flight test with a live chemical warhead. United Nations inspectors also found that Iraq had armed both rockets and artillery shells with biological agents.

Just imagine if an American city were ever struck by a missile fitted with a biological or chemical warhead. It could cause many times the deaths that occurred at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Yes, it is easier to carry out biological or chemical terror by using a crop duster to spray nerve gas or the U.S. mail to deliver anthrax. But those delivery systems will not produce the body counts genocidal maniacs like bin Laden and Saddam desire.

Let us have no illusions: The time will come, sooner rather than later, when an enemy nation — a terror-supporting state — successfully develops long-range missiles.

When that ominous day comes, the American people will be safe from biological or chemical attack only if their government already has deployed a national missile defense system.

*Joseph Perkins is a nationally syndicated columnist.*

Baltimore Sun  
October 30, 2001

## **Homeland Security Director Learning Job Under Spotlight**

### ***Little staff or expertise have led to rocky start for former Pa. governor***

By Susan Baer, Sun National Staff

WASHINGTON - President Bush formally convened his Homeland Security Council for the first time yesterday, shining a spotlight on what he calls the "war at home" and on the longtime political ally who has been struggling to find his footing as its leader.

As director of homeland security, Tom Ridge is charged with developing a strategy for protecting the country against a range of terrorist threats.

But in the three weeks that the former Pennsylvania governor has been officially on the job - with little staff and little expertise in the area of bioterrorism that is rocking the country - he's also had to devise a strategy for coordinating the sometimes conflicting information coming from all corners of the government.

After staying conspicuously in the shadows at the start of the anthrax scare, Ridge has been cast as the public face of the administration on terrorist threats. He's been appearing on morning TV talk shows, speaking to conferences of local officials and is beginning a routine of holding news briefings at least three times a week.

Yesterday - flanked by Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson, a scientist from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and officials from the Pentagon and Postal Service - Ridge told a news conference that he planned to continue bringing in specialists to answer those questions that he can't.

"I'm learning," he said as he deferred to the CDC official on a question about antibiotics to treat anthrax.

Indeed, even as he faces a mammoth task - trying to protect the nation from what he has called a "shadow enemy" that is "determined to murder innocent people" - Ridge is in the earliest stages of getting his office up and running.

### **Lots of reading, little sleep**

In meetings with lawmakers last week, he held up an organizational chart showing the more than 100 pieces of the anti-terrorism bureaucracy under his purview as evidence of the complexity of his task. He is said to be reading as much as he can pertaining to anti-terrorism and getting by on as little as three hours of sleep.

Some members of his personal staff of about 12, such as a newly appointed communications director, have not even started yet.

Just yesterday, the White House named six members of Ridge's team, including his deputy director, Adm. Steve Abbot, executive director of Vice President Dick Cheney's review of national preparedness; and his deputy assistant, Mark A. Holman, a Washington lawyer and longtime chief of staff to Ridge.

In creating the Office of Homeland Security, Bush said that nearly 100 employees from other agencies and departments would be on loan to Ridge. Those familiar with the operation say Ridge has asked to have those employees detailed to him for six months, with a plan to submit an outline to the president for a comprehensive national strategy by July.

Though many officials say they are granting Ridge a grace period, some members of Congress have noted with disappointment that even their calls to his assistants have gone unanswered.

"It's difficult to set up an operation and do the job at the same time," said Susan Neely, who is to begin next week as Ridge's communications director.

Baltimore Mayor Martin O'Malley, who recently asked the former governor if he would be an advocate for mayors in the White House, said he has received no assurances yet.

"They're not really doing much of anything right now - it's so early," O'Malley said of Ridge's office. "But a lot of us hold out a great deal of hope for him. He wants to do what the country needs him to do."

Ridge's first weeks on the job, working in a cramped office down the hall from the president, have been rocky at best.

He was criticized for initially playing down the danger posed by the anthrax contained in a letter to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle. Later, Ridge was forced to acknowledge that the anthrax in the Daschle letter was highly potent and deadly.

And the administration as a whole was widely criticized for its response in protecting postal workers, two of whom died from the disease. In contrast, Capitol Hill employees got quick attention.

Ridge declined to accept personal responsibility for the failure to alert and treat postal workers - a lapse that critics said resulted from poor communication between the FBI and public health agencies.

But on Wednesday night, Ridge called a meeting at the White House that brought together Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, Thompson, scientists and health officials to unify the government's message, to insist on greater communication between the FBI and health officials, and to assert his authority.

### **'Single worst week'**

Michael O'Hanlon, an analyst at the Brookings Institution, said the failure to immediately treat the postal workers at risk amounted to the "single worst week" in the performance of the government since the attacks Sept. 11.

O'Hanlon said he would not have expected Ridge to have a full grasp then of a situation that no one completely understood. But, in comments O'Hanlon described as "a half-step short of criticism," he said he hasn't seen Ridge "seize any reins that have done much for the national psyche."

But because Ridge has been on the job for less than a month, most lawmakers and officials say it is too soon to judge his performance.



"He's got a steep learning curve," says Rep. Christopher Shays, a Connecticut Republican who heads a House subcommittee on national security. "The position is new. He's new to the position. And also, he's new to the issue." For his part, Shays said he would prefer to see less of Ridge in the public arena, at least in his first three or four months on the job.

"I don't think it's to his advantage," Shays said of Ridge's news briefings. "He's trying to get his hands around a lot of things. You don't want to be exposing your ignorance publicly."

Even before Ridge arrived in Washington, some lawmakers had questioned how effective he could be with no control over the anti-terrorism budgets of the agencies he's pulling together and no statutory authority over those agencies. Many have called for legislation to create a Cabinet department, accountable to Congress, with full budget authority.

For his part, Ridge has insisted he has all the authority he needs because he has the ear - and the trust - of the president, to whom he reports directly and speaks with two to four times a day.

"I certainly have access," he told a mayors' conference last week. "And I believe I have the authority. I know I have the authority."

Still, some lawmakers have refused to back down from crafting a bill to make the office a Cabinet department, even after Ridge and Bush met at the White House last week with members of Congress to urge them to drop their bill. Tim Reeves, Ridge's press secretary when he was governor, said his former boss was well aware of the magnitude and difficulty of the job he was stepping into. On one of his last days in office in Pennsylvania, Reeves recalled, Ridge was honored with a video that paid tribute to him.

"He said it's unlikely his next assignment would end with a tribute video," Reeves said. "He had his eyes wide open about the complexity of the job, that it would be tough. But the president, in a time of crisis, asked him to lead the operation, and that was that."

Aerospace Daily  
October 31, 2001

## **Defense Department Accelerates Several ACTD Programs; Focus On Hard Targets**

The Department of Defense is accelerating a number of programs being pursued as Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations, focusing particularly on those that seek to destroy hardened and buried targets, according to Judith A. Daly, the assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for precision engagement.

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) provide funding to maturing technology to transition it from the laboratory to military users.

The Pentagon is seeking to accelerate ACTD programs that could be used in current operations, Daly said Oct. 30 at the 38th annual symposium of the Association of Old Crows. A number of precision engagement ACTDs that can be used against hard targets have already been accelerated, she said.

So-called hard targets have been a particular concern in Afghanistan. Senior defense officials have noted that the air strikes have had a difficult time locating and attacking Taliban troops and military equipment hidden in the country's numerous caves.

There was already an emphasis on precision engagement in the ACTD program, according to Daly. "Since the beginning of the program, there have been 84 ACTDs - 34 are finished. Out of the 84, 35 percent - or 29 - fall under the precision engagement arena," she said.

DOD is accelerating a number of programs funded under fiscal year 2001 and 2002 ACTDs, according to Daly, including Counter Proliferation I (CPI) and Counter-Proliferation II (CPII).

CPI integrates weapons, sensors, and target planning tools to provide precision attack against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) targets. The main components of CPI are an advanced unitary penetrator, a hard target smart fuse and target planning software. CPII - also accelerated - provides a stand-off capability to CPI.

The target planning software in CPI was used during operations Desert Thunder and Allied Force, Daly said, and is now becoming the NATO standard. The Navy is buying 500 of the warheads used on CPI and the smart fuse has been procured by the Air Force.

DOD is using "some elements" of CPI in current operations, Daly said, though she did not specify which ones. For CPII, DOD is accelerating the Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) to meet current operational needs, she said.

The Hard Target Defeat (HTD) thermobaric weapon is also being accelerated, Daly said. Thermobaric weapons - sometimes called vacuum bombs - ignite at high temperature, sucking the oxygen out of underground targets. Originally designed to hit WMD targets in North Korea, the accelerated program is now focusing on the weapon's use against complex, deep tunnels found in "other areas of the world," Daly said.

Thermobaric weapons use high-temperature incendiaries against chemical and biological facilities, Daly said. "This candidate promises to allow us to neutralize the [WMD] agent without spilling all over the place or becoming aerosol." The program also allows the military "to attack WMD facilities while minimizing collateral damage," she added.

#### **Network-Centric Collaborative Targeting accelerated**

DOD is also accelerating programs that will improve the quality of targeting, Daly said. In particular, Network-Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT), a FY '01 ACTD, is being accelerated to deal with shortcomings in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).

NCCT links a number of ISR platforms, including Rivet Joint, Guardrail, JSTARS, AWACS, Global Hawk, Predator, U-2, EP-3E, Nimrod, and ASTOR, to reduce the location error for critical time targets.

"The problem with SIGINT is that it can be very fast, but the location errors can be quite dramatic," Daly said. For example, "a single platform cannot begin to meet the timelines" needed for the Joint Direct Attack Munition and the High Speed Antiradiation Missile.

"When you start to add two SIGINT platforms working together, you begin to get to the weapon systems requirements," she said. "It's only when you get three platforms, and start adding imagery to the SIGINT, that you really meet the timeline aperture requirements of the weapons."

NCCT helps overcome this problem by combining data from multiple platforms to provide faster and more accurate target identification and classification. "The objective of NCCT is to solve that problem by building and demonstrating networks that link up the platforms."

U.S. Central Command is the operational sponsor for the NTTC. Originally, NTTC was scheduled to be operational by FY '04, but this timeline has now been moved up, according to Daly.

-- *Sharon Weinberger*

Congressional Quarterly Weekly

October 27, 2001

Pg. 2554

## **Bush's Deferral Of Anti-Missile Tests Buys Time For ABM Treaty Workaround**

By Pat Towell, CQ Staff

The Bush administration's decision Oct. 25 to defer missile defense tests that could violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty improves the odds for working out an agreement with Russian President Vladimir V. Putin on a new "strategic framework" that could accommodate the missile system Bush is determined to build.

The program, intended to fend off missile attacks by rogue states or terrorist groups, would violate the treaty, which Russia insists is a cornerstone of strategic stability. The search for a new U.S.-Russian agreement — either a substantial revision of the ABM Treaty or a replacement for it — is expected to be the focal point of Putin's discussions with Bush when he visits Washington and Bush's Texas ranch next month.

In recent weeks, Putin and other Russian officials have hinted that such a deal might be reached, if it includes a significant reduction in U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear missiles. The administration, focused on coalition-building for the war on terrorism in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, is intent on improving its ties with Moscow.

However, in announcing on Oct. 25 that the tests would be delayed, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld also highlighted the administration's insistence that its anti-missile defense effort will be hamstrung if the ABM Treaty is not quickly and significantly changed.

"For some time now, we've advised the Congress and the government of the Russian Federation that the planned missile defense testing program . . . was going to bump up against the ABM Treaty. That has now happened," Rumsfeld said, adding that it should give impetus to the Bush-Putin discussions.

Domestic critics of the missile defense plan challenge that view, insisting that the technology is so far from being ready for deployment that necessary testing could be conducted for several years without conflicting with the treaty. Indeed, some critics contend that the Bush administration's missile defense advocates scheduled superfluous tests to force a showdown on the treaty.

"I don't think these tests were particularly important," Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich., said Oct. 25.

In the aftermath of the attacks, the political atmosphere in Washington and Moscow has changed in ways that could make a Bush-Putin deal more likely. But several countervailing forces cast doubts on the outcome of the meeting.

### **A Change in Perceptions**

Although missile defense has been a back-burner issue while Congress and the administration focus on anti-terrorism, leading figures on both sides of the U.S. missile defense debate say the shock of the attacks has altered the perspective.

"What's changed, and changed dramatically, is the public's level of tolerance for vulnerability," says Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a centrist think-tank in Washington.

Insofar as this makes it more likely that Bush would prevail in a political showdown with critics of the anti-missile program, it might persuade Putin that the United States will push ahead, with or without Moscow's concurrence.

The administration argued from the outset that if Moscow were convinced the missile defense program could not be derailed, Russia would agree to some new framework that would accommodate the U.S. plan.

On the other hand, the attackers' use of hijacked airliners underscores the skeptics' argument that a rogue state or terrorist group is less likely to use a long-range ballistic missile to strike U.S. targets than more readily available means.

"Because we've been struck at home, it may increase support [for missile defense]," said Senate Armed Services Committee member Joseph I. Lieberman, D-Conn. "But because we've been struck by terrorists, it may increase competition for funding."

Lieberman, one of the strongest supporters of missile defense, shares that view with veteran liberal arms control lobbyist John D. Isaacs, president of the Council for a Livable World, a prominent opponent of Bush's plan.

"There's a lot of new money [for defense], but there also are a lot of costly new needs in terms of homeland defense and in terms of fighting a war in Afghanistan," Isaacs said. "Now missile defense has to compete with air marshals on airplanes and greater security around airports."

Past congressional action on missile defense has been dominated by the ideologically charged battle over the treaty.

In a new twist, the House Appropriations Committee subjected Bush's fiscal 2002 missile defense request to the same green-eyeshade scrutiny it applies to other big-ticket programs when it marked up the pending Pentagon spending bill. Citing various technical or schedule reasons, the committee sliced \$441 million from the \$8.3 billion request.

### **Moscow's New Position**

In Moscow, the perspective on the missile defense issue also may have changed since Sept. 11 in ways that would make Russia more tolerant of changes to the ABM Treaty. Russia's cooperation with the U.S. military campaign against Osama bin Laden, his al Qaeda network and Afghanistan's ruling Taliban militia, which is bin Laden's host, gives Moscow bargaining leverage with Washington.

Rumsfeld denied that the deferral of the missile defense tests was a payback for Putin's staunch support of Bush's declaration of war against terrorism. "It is not a bone to anybody," he said.

But Levin saw the delay as evidence that Bush's need to round up allies — particularly Russia — to support operations in Afghanistan may have made him more sensitive to Putin's concerns about the ABM pact. "It suggests that he's going to be a little more cautious about a unilateral withdrawal from the treaty," Levin said.

Russia's avowed rationale for insisting that the treaty be preserved is that it undergirds mutual deterrence between the two nuclear powers. If the United States had a more extensive missile defense than the limited one allowed by the treaty, it could knock out Russia's nuclear force in a first strike and then fend off the few surviving missiles that Moscow could launch in retaliation. Even if that scenario never occurred, the knowledge that it could happen would give the United States an intolerable degree of psychological leverage over Russia, according to this reasoning.

And many observers think the pact is at least as important to Moscow symbolically as it is militarily. With Russia's economy shaky and large parts of its military establishment in decay, its strategic nuclear force is one of its few claims to superpower status. The ABM Treaty and the other strategic arms agreements embody the country's status as an equal of the United States.

To the extent that Bush accords Putin standing as a valued partner in the war on terrorism, it might be easier for Russia to accept a new strategic framework that would supplant the ABM Treaty, particularly if it requires the United States to make the same kind of deep cuts in its nuclear force that Russia soon will have to make for budgetary reasons.

Currently, the United States has more than 7,000 long-range nuclear warheads and Russia has more than 6,000. Russia has pressed for years to cut that number to about 1,500, but the Pentagon has resisted a reduction that large. Bush promised significant — but unspecified — nuclear arms reductions during the 2000 presidential campaign. James M. Lindsay of the Brookings Institution argues that given the emphasis Russia has placed on preserving the ABM Treaty thus far, Putin will run a significant political risk if he abandons that position without being able to claim substantial concessions from Bush. "You can't just all of a sudden say, 'Oops,' " Lindsay said. But Russia's willingness to deal also will hinge on how much flexibility Bush demands on missile defense, and that may not be clear until the meeting in November. "We're going to see where the bottom lines are," Lindsay said. "It's possible that the president himself doesn't know."

#### **Navy Anti-Missile Test**

The deferred tests would have involved use of an Aegis radar aboard a warship to track a long-range missile to assess the feasibility of modifying the Navy's fleet of ships to supplement other anti-missile weapons. The ABM Treaty prohibits sea-based defenses against long-range ballistic missiles.

The decision dismayed conservative missile defense advocates, such as Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation, who warned that it would only weaken U.S. bargaining leverage. "The message you will send to the Russians is . . . 'Dig in,' " he said.

But this is not the first time Bush has disappointed the missile defense hard-liners by avoiding a confrontation with Moscow over the treaty. While repeatedly insisting that he would "go beyond" the treaty as soon as a defense was ready to be deployed, Bush has rejected several policies that would have forced an early showdown on the issue. For instance, the administration accepts the treaty as binding, despite the insistence of many conservatives — including some appointed to senior posts in the administration — that the treaty ceased to exist when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.

Washington Times

October 29, 2001

Pg. 11

## **Lawmakers Look To Expand Role Of VA In U.S. Disasters**

By Jennifer Sergent, Scripps Howard News Service

Among the myriad federal agencies responding to the Sept. 11 attacks, one has received little attention for its work, even though it operates the largest hospital infrastructure in the nation and is the pre-eminent authority on treating war-related injuries and post-traumatic stress disorder.

In times of emergency, the Department of Veterans Affairs assumes a mission beyond that of caring for veterans. It acts as a medical backup to the Department of Defense and, when requested, offers care to civilian victims of major disasters.

In the wake of Sept. 11, lawmakers want to expand this mission.

The agency already purchases and manages supplies for the national pharmaceutical stockpile to treat biological and chemical toxins. It also opened two centers this year to research new treatments for war-related illnesses.

Now, lawmakers on the House and Senate Veterans Affairs committees want the VA to open four additional medical centers to address the needs of victims of biological, chemical and nuclear hazards.

They also are trying to give the VA a louder voice at the table with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Departments of Defense and Health and Human Services as the federal government reacts to domestic disasters.

Can the VA handle these new obligations? Even though it is the second-largest federal agency, behind the Defense Department, the VA doesn't get a lot of respect. Its \$50 billion budget has been stagnant over the past several years. The agency says budget problems and a general lack of resources prevent the VA from properly carrying out its chief mission to care for veterans, let alone its secondary emergency response missions.

"Some regions of VA's health care system would be hard-pressed if they were required to treat military and civilian casualties of chemical or biological agents in addition to carrying out their primary mission of providing health care to veterans," VA Secretary Anthony J. Principi told the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee on Oct. 16.

In the days following Sept. 11, Mr. Principi formed an emergency preparedness working group to evaluate agency shortcomings in responding to a crisis.

The findings include:

\*The inventories of drugs and equipment at VA medical centers are not adequate to address medical needs in the first hours after an attack, especially one involving chemical agents.

\*A call-up of National Guard and military reservists would result in severe medical staffing shortages at VA facilities.

\*A long-term assignment of VA specialists in post-traumatic stress counseling to treat disaster victims would reduce the VA's ability to treat veterans.

The VA needs at least \$250 million to correct those deficiencies and others that the working group identified, Mr. Principi said. That money doesn't include what might be needed to assume the broader mission that lawmakers are talking about.

While the VA deals with these shortcomings, it also is trying to obtain \$550 million to repair aging medical facilities in the next two years. This year, the agency faced an \$800 million shortfall in its budget for general operations.

"It seems obvious that we are going to have to have additional resources for the VA to expand its mission," said Rep. Bob Filner, California Democrat and ranking member of the House Veterans Affairs Committee.

"We have something that no other agency has," said Mark Brown, director of the environmental agents service in the VA's office of public health and environmental hazards. "We have a national hospital system and we have expertise in dealing with war-related injuries and psychological counseling. It's got to be feasible to apply that expertise to incidents that occur here at home."

Washington Post

October 31, 2001

Pg. 18

## **Hill Mail Still Untested 2 Weeks After Daschle Letter**

By Susan Schmidt and Rick Weiss, Washington Post Staff Writers

More than two weeks after a letter laden with anthrax spores arrived at the office of Senate Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle, authorities have yet to begin testing other Capitol Hill mail to determine whether it has been tainted by the contaminated letter, officials said yesterday.

Several House members complained that federal officials are learning about potential cross-contamination by following the trail of sick citizens instead of looking for tainted letters. It is imperative that the government learn quickly whether ordinary mail is potentially deadly, they said.

"This delay is very disturbing, as over two weeks has passed since the Daschle letter was opened," leaders of the House Government Reform Committee wrote to the FBI, the U.S. Postal Service and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

The concerns were raised after an FBI official told the House panel that a facility has just been located to examine congressional mail quarantined since Oct. 17 in the mailrooms in the Ford House Annex and the Dirksen Senate Office Building. The mail is being sent first to a private firm in Lima, Ohio, where it will be irradiated to kill any potential anthrax bacteria.

"Currently we are learning about potential cross-contamination by investigating the potential exposures of citizens who fall ill with symptoms of anthrax. But this approach is reactive and encourages fear," wrote Chairman Dan Burton (R-Ind.) and Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) in a rare joint letter from normally partisan combatants. They urged a "pro-active approach" in which all mail known to have had contact with the Daschle letter would be examined to determine the presence and quantity of anthrax spores, and whether such spores have the capacity to become airborne and cause inhalational anthrax.

Chief Postal Inspector Kenneth Weaver said yesterday that the sanitized mail will be examined in a secure facility whose location he would not divulge. The Daschle letter has been undergoing analysis at an Army lab at Fort Detrick in Maryland. Postal inspectors and the FBI have been hampered by the lack of a biologically secure facility in which to examine the potentially hazardous mail, officials said.

Rep. Mike Pence (R-Ind.), whose Longworth office has been contaminated with anthrax, said he learned from the House attending physician's office that the letter delivered to Daschle's office contained a much more concentrated dose of anthrax than had been detected on the House side.

"There were two grams of anthrax in the Daschle letter, containing billions of spores," Pence said, adding that investigators had only discovered "hundreds, maybe thousands of spores" in three Longworth offices.

Pence added that both health experts and Capitol Police officials told him they were now convinced a second anthrax-laden letter exists.

"There's a lot of evidence that we're dealing with cross-contamination," he said. "Somewhere in the system our mail got friendly with mail that got compromised, a letter that was exuding this material."

One worry raised by Burton and Waxman yesterday may be unfounded. They said they were concerned that the sterilization of the letters at the irradiation facility will make it impossible to conduct tests on the envelopes and letters for the presence of anthrax spores.

It is true, experts said, that once the spores have been killed they can no longer be cultured in growth media and made to grow into colonies -- the gold standard for identifying and quantifying spores. But even after the spores are killed they can still be detected by other means.

Some tests, for example, are designed to detect the protein coating on the outside of spores. Although irradiation may alter some of those proteins, many will probably remain intact and detectable, according to one expert involved in environmental anthrax testing. Other tests, such as the polymerase chain reaction, or PCR, which detects genetic material inside spores, may also still work on irradiated spores -- though perhaps less well than protein-detecting tests, the scientists said, since DNA can be damaged by radiation.

*Staff writers Ellen Nakashima and Juliet Eilperin contributed to this report.*

New York Times

October 31, 2001

### The Stockpile

## **U.S. Seeks Anthrax Vaccine For Almost 1 Million People**

By Nicholas Wade

The government wants access to a stock of anthrax vaccine large enough to protect almost a million people, Tommy G. Thompson, the secretary of health and human services, said yesterday.

The stock is held by the BioPort Corporation of Lansing, Mich., but it cannot be used yet because the Food and Drug Administration has not completed its inspection of the vaccine lots or of the plant where they were manufactured.

Mr. Thompson said that F.D.A. inspectors would visit the plant shortly and that if all went well BioPort could resume manufacturing as early as Nov. 22.

BioPort began making and stockpiling anthrax vaccine in May 2000, but the company has refused to discuss the exact size of its stockpile other than to say it is large. Mr. Thompson said today that BioPort had five million doses of vaccine. A company spokeswoman said she could not comment on the stockpile's size or the company's production capacity.

Six doses are needed for a full vaccination for one person, so five million doses would be enough for 833,000 people. But vaccinations could probably be started, if necessary, on about two million people because the shots are spread over 18 months and substantial benefit is obtained after the first two shots.

If anthrax vaccine becomes generally available, some experts say it should be given in addition to antibiotics to people who may have been exposed to anthrax. Pending a report from a panel of experts, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is considering recommending the vaccine for postal sorters and others who might be at long-term risk. Continual use of antibiotics is not advisable because of side effects and the risk of promoting resistant strains of bacteria.

BioPort's stockpile of unapproved anthrax vaccine is owned by the Department of Defense for vaccinating military personnel, as is the dwindling stock of approved vaccine made by BioPort's predecessor, the Michigan Department of Health. This approved vaccine is also the source of the regular immunizations given to people at constant high risk, including veterinarians and laboratory workers.

Mr. Thompson said that he was asking the Defense Department to share its vaccine and that any delay was because "they want to make sure they can afford to give up what we are asking for."

Scripps Howard News Service (SHNS.com)  
October 30, 2001

## Secret Desert Project On Anthrax

By Joan Lowy, Scripps Howard News Service

Last year, scientists at a secretly constructed laboratory in the Nevada desert manufactured simulated anthrax germs using off-the-shelf technology and over-the-counter equipment - a project that seems eerily prescient in light of the current germ attacks.

What they discovered is not encouraging: For about \$1.6 million, a small group of microbiologists and engineers could grow enough anthrax to kill or injure thousands of people without detection by U.S. law-enforcement or intelligence agencies.

Although defense officials said the project did not take the production process to its final conclusion and "weaponize" the germ, its results tend to lend credence to arguments that the anthrax germs in the current attacks may have been produced domestically.

Last week, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said the anthrax involved in the letter attacks could have been produced by a "Ph.D. microbiologist ... in a small, well-equipped microbiology lab," although some bioterrorism experts said that was understating the complexity of such an effort.

The desert program, parts of which remain classified, was officially named Biotechnology Activity Characterization by Unconventional Signatures, or Project BACUS for short. It was run primarily by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which was created by the Defense Department in 1998 to address biological, chemical and nuclear weapons proliferation issues.

Beginning in late 1999, scientists constructed a laboratory in the desert at the old Nevada Test Site, which had closed seven years earlier after an underground nuclear weapons testing moratorium went into effect. No germ warfare experts were involved in the experiment - only microbiologists and engineers with the kind of experience that might be commonly found in the pharmaceutical or pesticide industry.

Using equipment bought at hardware stores, through catalogues or from commercial suppliers - pipes, filters, a fermenter to grow the germs, an electric boiler to maintain the water supply and to sterilize the fermenter, and a biosafety box to control air flow - project participants set up a laboratory in an old recreation hall and barbershop. Within weeks, they were able to produce significant quantities of bacillus thuringiensis and bacillus globigii, two germs that are closely related to anthrax, but are not harmful. For test purposes, it was effectively the same thing as producing anthrax for weaponization.

"We were growing simulants, but a terrorist could easily grow anthrax in a facility like this and produce enough quantity in covert delivery to kill, say, 10,000 people in a large city," said Jay Davis, the former head of the threat reduction agency who oversaw the project and is now a physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California.

Project BACUS did not mill the germs to particles of one to three microns - the size necessary to cause inhalation anthrax, the most dangerous form of the disease - or coat the germ spores with a material to help them stay airborne and keep them from clumping, which would be the normal procedure in a state-sponsored biological weapons program and which appears to be the case in the current anthrax attacks.

The reason for not fully weaponizing the anthrax was that defense officials did not want to violate the international treaty banning biological weapons production, Davis said.

The project also did not attempt to develop a means to widely disperse anthrax spores - a key hurdle if terrorists were to try to kill large numbers of people with the bacteria, Davis said.

"The real question is not the amount, but how well they disperse it," Davis said. "The current anthrax going through the mail is the perfect example. People talk about grams killing thousands of people. Maybe a gram went through the mail, but it only made a few people sick. ... Hypothetically, the same amount that has caused the problem in Washington, if you had optimally dispersed it over a football game, would have caused a lot more infection simply because you would have had more people you could get at better."

A key finding of the project was that the simulated anthrax laboratory didn't have any significant "signature" - a sign that law-enforcement or intelligence agencies could look for to try to spot terrorists at work.

Sensors were placed around and away from the facilities. The project looked for similar kinds of things law-enforcement agencies look for when they are trying to find illegal drug dealers making methamphetamine - key

purchases of materials or equipment and the presence of certain chemicals, sounds, odors or amounts of heat. Germ batches were produced in the winter of 1999 and the summer of 2000 to test for differences between seasons.

"What came out of it is that by the determinations that they were making (using sensors) it didn't have a significant signature that would send off alarms or surveillance of something like that," said Dr. Craig Smith, a member of the bioterrorism working group for the Infectious Disease Society of America and a former instructor at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, the military's lead laboratory for medical aspects of biowarfare defense.

Project BACUS showed that it is "pretty easy to hide something if you were smart enough to get all the parts and the pieces and put it together," Smith said.

The threat reduction agency went public with Project BACUS on Sept. 4, exactly one week before the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon.

"We wish we had done it (the project) sooner, as always," Davis said. "You are caught in this dilemma of how do you invest against relatively rare, high-consequence events. We would be happiest if this investment had been a waste of money, but that is not the way it came out."

New York Times

October 31, 2001

Washington

## **Chasing Bioterror Around Beltway, From The Senate To The C.I.A.**

By David Stout

WASHINGTON, Oct. 30 — The fear of anthrax first flared here on Monday, Oct. 15. That morning, when an aide opened a letter to Senator Tom Daschle in the senator's office in the Hart Building near the Capitol, an odd powdery substance was visible.

Mr. Daschle's aides were alarmed. After all, a photo editor at a Florida tabloid had died of anthrax just 10 days earlier. And the letter to Mr. Daschle, the Senate majority leader, was postmarked in Trenton, where a contaminated letter had been mailed to NBC News in New York.

The letter to Mr. Daschle was quickly tested in an Army laboratory, which detected anthrax. The Capitol's mail-delivery system was shut down. Mr. Daschle's office was quarantined, and dozens of Capitol aides were put on antibiotics.

The next day, Oct. 16, after lawmakers were briefed by federal agents and an epidemiologist, Mr. Daschle said they were told "it was a very strong form of anthrax, a very potent form of anthrax which clearly was produced by someone who knew what he or she was doing."

That day, too, a Postal Service worker named Joseph P. Curseen Jr. told his wife, Celeste, that he thought he was coming down with a cold or food poisoning. He felt awful.

The next day, Oct. 17, building- design experts said it was unlikely that anthrax spores could have spread in significant amounts through the Hart Building ventilation system. But the system was shut down as a precaution. Before nightfall, preliminary tests showed that about 30 workers on Capitol Hill had been exposed to spores from the letter. There was considerable confusion over the exact number but agreement that there was reason to worry. All six Senate and House office buildings were closed for screening, and the House leadership decided to adjourn for the week while the Senate chose to stay in session. The authorities tried for the right mix of caution and calm, emphasizing that anthrax is usually treatable with antibiotics and that, in any event, there was no evidence that anyone had actually become infected.

And dangerous or not, the spores in the Daschle letter were "sensitive" to a wide range of antibiotics, meaning treatment should be easy, several experts said.

Evidence of anthrax was also found in the Senate mailroom in the Dirksen Office Building next to the Hart Building, officials said. The rapid dispersal of the material indicated that it was in small particles easily transported in the air.

Meanwhile, Mr. Curseen, 47, who worked at the huge mail-processing center on Brentwood Road in Northeast Washington, was feeling no better. Another Brentwood worker, Thomas L. Morris Jr., 55, was also under the weather. So were two other Brentwood employees.



Postal officials began testing the Brentwood center for contamination on Thursday, Oct. 18, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began testing that Friday. Numerous traces of anthrax were found. Contamination began showing up in other places, including mail machines in House office buildings and a building that handles Senate mail.

Mr. Curseen went to church that Saturday, Oct. 20, and fainted. He was taken to a hospital, where doctors said he had the flu and sent him home. His condition worsened, as did that of Mr. Morris. On Sunday, Oct. 21, Mr. Morris died. Mr. Curseen died the next day. Health officials said two other Brentwood workers also had pulmonary anthrax and were in serious condition.

Recriminations and second-guessing began almost immediately. Since it had been known for days that some postal workers in Trenton, where the Daschle letter was mailed, had fallen ill, and since it was also known that the Daschle letter had passed through Brentwood, why was more attention not paid to the Brentwood center — and its workers — earlier?

There were no quick answers, except that many doctors and scientists had never dealt with anthrax.

On Tuesday, Oct. 23, traces of anthrax were found in a mail center that serves the White House. The center is miles from the White House itself, but the news was disquieting.

By then, thousands of postal workers were being given antibiotics, and health officials acknowledged having underestimated the danger.

On Thursday, Oct. 25, a worker who handles State Department mail in Virginia was found to have inhalation anthrax. His was the first illness in the Washington area not directly connected to the Brentwood center. That night, the Central Intelligence Agency said trace amounts of anthrax had turned up in a mailroom at its Virginia headquarters.

On Friday, traces of anthrax were found at a Supreme Court mail center in suburban Maryland, and at mail sites for the Walter Reed Army Medical Center and its research laboratory. Later, a tiny amount of anthrax was found in the court building itself, forcing the justices to convene in an appeals court building, and in the State Department headquarters.

By today, traces of anthrax had been found in well over a dozen places in the Washington area, from government landmarks to neighborhood post offices, stretching from Capitol Hill across the District of Columbia to Maryland and Virginia.

What all sites had in common, as far as anyone knew, was that their mail came through Brentwood.

By tonight, the only known source of contamination was the Daschle letter. Some speculated that there might be at least one other tainted letter. But no prediction seemed safe.

Christian Science Monitor  
October 31, 2001

## **Nuclear Attack A Real, If Remote, Possibility**

***US eyes Pakistan, former Soviet Union as likely sources of weapons-grade material.***

By Brad Knickerbocker, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington -- As the story goes, Osama bin Laden offered criminals in Chechnya \$30 million and two tons of opium in return for 20 Russian nuclear warheads.

The chilling account, contained in a 1999 Arab-language news report, may be apocryphal. But what is certain is that for most of the 1990s, Mr. bin Laden has been trying to get materials to make a nuclear bomb. Acquiring weapons of mass destruction, he has said, is a "religious duty" necessary "to terrorize the enemies of God." Some of his associates (now in prison or witness-protection programs) have recounted efforts to obtain weapons-grade uranium or plutonium.

Today, as the United States bombs terrorist sites and other targets in Afghanistan, the prospect of a nuclear terrorist attack looms larger as a domestic security concern. The likelihood of such an attack, government officials and experts say, may be small - but the possible consequences are too horrific to ignore.

Among the major concerns:

- The political instability of Pakistan, a nuclear power in the region that - more so than Russia and former Soviet states - could be Mr. bin Laden's source of nuclear materials. The Pakistani intelligence service used to work closely

with Afghanistan's ruling Taliban regime, and many in Pakistan (including, perhaps, military and intelligence sources) support the Taliban and bin Laden. Last week, Pakistan detained for questioning two of its former senior nuclear-weapons scientists - men who have expressed sympathy with the Taliban cause.

- Knowledge that with relatively little radioactive material - even low-level waste from a power plant or medical facility - terrorists could construct a "dirty bomb" using simple explosives rather than the more sophisticated and difficult-to-build nuclear weapons. Such devices, hidden in a truck or ship-borne cargo container, could inflict considerable casualties followed by widespread radiation poisoning.

- Vulnerability of 10 major nuclear-weapons plants in the US, several of which are near major cities. In mock attacks, the "terrorists" were able to acquire weapons-grade nuclear materials or otherwise achieve their goals in more than half the cases.

In the face of such threats, the US is considering several options.

These include strengthening nuclear-nonproliferation treaties, increasing security at US nuclear-weapons facilities, and buying Russia's leftover nuclear materials. More immediately, some experts suggest preparing US Special Operations Forces to unilaterally disable or seize Pakistan's nuclear weapons. (In the New Yorker magazine this week, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh writes that US military and intelligence agents are training with an Israeli special-operations unit for such a mission.)

In addition, several US lawmakers have said America should be prepared to use its tactical nuclear weapons to prevent or respond to another domestic terrorist attack. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld - repeating long-standing US military doctrine - has not ruled that out.

While the former Soviet Union has been a top concern - officials there can't account for all nuclear-weapons items, and many now-jobless nuclear scientists may be susceptible to bribery - much of the focus is now on Pakistan.

"Pakistan's military government is walking a tightrope between pressure from the Bush administration on one side and anti-American Islamic militants on the other," says Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information here. "Growing street opposition from the latter could certainly destabilize or even topple the regime, and in the midst of such dissolution, the weakening of nuclear security would inevitably occur."

"The ranks of government and military personnel are also fairly riddled with sympathizers of the radical Islamic faction, posing a distinct risk of insiders colluding to spirit away a bomb or two for bin Laden and other terrorists," says Dr. Blair, a former US Air Force nuclear-missile launch control officer.

Intelligence sources believe that Pakistan has enough plutonium and weapons-grade enriched uranium to make 30 to 50 nuclear bombs or warheads.

"Whether or not all of Pakistan's nuclear explosive material has been converted to nuclear weapons is unknown, leaving the possibility that many kilograms of bulk material may be poorly protected," warns the Institute for Science and International Security. "Security forces at storage sites may be unable to thwart a determined attack by extremist groups allied with bin Laden or the Taliban, particularly if even a small number of guards are sympathetic to the Islamic fundamentalist cause. In the extreme case - should extremists take over the Pakistani government - control over Pakistan's nuclear explosive materials and weapons could be lost irretrievably."

Testimony in the trial of men charged with the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania revealed that bin Laden associates in Sudan may have tried to obtain uranium for a radiological weapon - material that may have originated in South Africa.

Meanwhile, concern for the safety of US nuclear-weapons plants is mounting. A recent report by the Project on Government Oversight warned of "serious security flaws at nuclear- weapons facilities around the country." "When our security efforts do not protect our weapons-grade nuclear materials against over half the mock terrorist attacks, it is well past time for a reassessment," says Danielle Brian of the watchdog group.

Rep. Christopher Shays (R) of Connecticut, chairman of the House National Security Subcommittee, is planning to investigate. "In this critical environment," he says, "it is important for the Department of Energy [which oversees the US nuclear-weapons program] to assure the integrity of basic security measures for the protection of nuclear-weapon facilities ... against both internal and external threats."

National Review online  
October 29, 2001

**ABM ABC's**  
*Time to move on.*

By Henry F. Cooper, *chairman of High Frontier*. Cooper was SDI director during the first Bush administration and President Reagan's ambassador and chief negotiator at the Geneva Defense and Space Talks with the Soviet Union. Last summer, Bush administration officials began noting that the Pentagon's programs to develop and test systems to defend U.S. citizens against ballistic-missile attack would soon "bump up" against ABM Treaty constraints — and then, as National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice told Washington Times editors on August 1, the president had pledged that "since we don't plan to violate the Treaty that would mean we would have to withdraw."

Well, we're indisputably now at that point.

Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld announced last Thursday that, because of treaty constraints, the Navy would not be able to use its existing Aegis sea-based radar to track upcoming tests of strategic missiles.

There is more to this development than first meets the eye.

Developing sea-based defenses was, I believe, the most important initiative of my watch as director of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) during the first Bush administration. It was obvious then (and it still is) that the Navy's existing Aegis system can be rapidly and relatively inexpensively improved to provide wide-area defenses for our overseas troops, friends, and allies — and also for Americans at home.

There's only one significant problem — and it is a major one. Article 5 of the ABM Treaty bans development, testing, and deployment of sea-based defenses for America. And Article 6 prohibits testing of sea-based "theater defenses" against so-called "strategic" missiles. Sea-based defenses to protect our overseas troops, friends, and allies are permitted, but those defenses cannot be used to protect Americans at home — at least under the ABM Treaty. My plan was to build an effective wide-area sea-based defense for our overseas troops, friends, and allies within four years — which is permitted by the treaty — and then improve it to protect the American people. I could not imagine that Americans would tolerate their tax dollars being used only to defend others when that system, with relatively minor system improvements, would also defend them.

The Navy agreed to start a serious development.

Before leaving the Pentagon in January 1993, I warned the chief of naval operations, Admiral Frank Kelso, to be careful in developing a sea-based theater defense, because the ABM Treaty lawyers would block even its development and testing if there were any hint that system was intended to protect Americans at home.

No doubt the Clinton administration, which was devoted to the ABM Treaty, understood the inherent capability of such sea-based defenses and effectively scuttled the program I left to them — which had been fully funded to provide an initial capability as early as in 1997.

Congress supported development of sea-based defenses — especially after the 1994 elections — and added funds each subsequent year to push the system ahead. But, year after year, the Clinton administration delayed program execution by holding up funds and conducting over a dozen studies — all of which concluded that sea-based defenses made sense.

When serious development was finally undertaken, they "dumbed-down" the system. As Deputy Defense Secretary John Deutch indicated in 1995, the Clinton Navy theater-wide system could not intercept strategic ballistic missiles and therefore would be consistent with the ABM Treaty.

What he didn't choose to elaborate was that they slowed down the defensive interceptor rocket, did not use the most capable state-of-the-art interceptor sensors, precluded use of external sensor fire-control data other than from the co-located Aegis radar, and adopted a firing protocol that precluded intercept attempts until after the target rockets engines burn out — so nearby defensive interceptors would be in a tail chase after a faster strategic rocket and of course could not catch up.

These are ludicrous constraints from a technical and military perspective — and they were well known to the new Bush administration, which — as yet — has done little to relieve them.

Bear in mind that the Bunker Hill, the Navy's oldest Aegis Cruiser, tracked Chinese ballistic missiles launched to intimidate the Taiwanese during their first democratic presidential election in 1996. The same software improvements that made tracking possible then, would have permitted an existing Aegis cruiser to gather useful data in the upcoming missile-defense tests — except for the treaty.

More important is that this is a most timid "bump up" against the treaty. Far more important conflicts with the treaty would be resulting soon, if they had not already been evident, had the new Bush administration resurrected Bush I missile-defense programs canceled by the Clinton administration — and thus moved ahead on an urgent schedule to develop sea- and space-based defenses as quickly as possible.

For some unexplained reason the administration has kept these most effective and less expensive options for global defenses on the backburner while they have expanded, with relatively minor modifications, the much more expensive and less effective Clinton ground-based defense plan, which was designed to fail.

I have testified to Congress on how treaty constraints had, on my watch and earlier, cost us time and money and if not removed could one day cost us lives. Secretary Rumsfeld's announcement last week makes clear the current Bush administration is continuing this unwise practice.

Hopefully, President Bush will soon keep the campaign promise he made on May 23, 2000:

*At the earliest possible date, my administration will deploy antiballistic missile systems, both theater and national, to guard against attack and blackmail. We will offer Russia amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty — an artifact of the Cold War confrontation. Both sides know that we live in a different world than in 1972 when the Treaty was signed. If Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give prompt notice, under the provisions of the Treaty, that we can no longer be party to it. I will have a solemn obligation to protect the American people and our allies, not to protect arms control agreements signed almost 30 years ago. Given today's realities, we can no longer drag our feet on building and deploying a missile defense system; nor can we allow Cold War arms control agreements to restrict America's ability to defend itself and its allies.*

The president should have fulfilled this 18-month-old promise by now. And surely, after September 11 proved there are people who will happily die to kill Americans, it is intolerable to continue dumbing down our defenses because of the ABM Treaty. All adversaries simply are not deterred by threats of retaliation.

As President Bush said after meeting with Russian President Putin in Shanghai, "The events of September 11 make it clearer than ever that a Cold War treaty that prevents us from defending our people is outdated and, I believe, dangerous."

Indeed, September 11 has changed everything. No one now argues the benefits of vulnerability — or that no one would dare attack us for fear that we would retaliate. Deterrence does not work against terrorists. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban knew we would find out they was behind September 11 and come after them.

The president says we are after the terrorists and states that harbor them. His "coalition" strategy gets in the way of going after them all at once. But they must be on our target list if we are to rid the world of terrorism. Does anyone believe that Iraq, for instance, is not in cahoots with bin Laden? Perhaps Saddam Hussein provided the Anthrax and/or know-how that has shut down both houses of Congress and killed innocent Americans. And remember that Saddam said in 1991 he would have attacked American cities had he the missiles to reach them. Do we doubt him? Make no mistake — many who argue against American defenses, including Russia and China, are involved in proliferating weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them.

And as Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld told journalists during his recent visit to Russia, "A weapon of mass destruction can be delivered over intercontinental range by a ballistic missile that has less than intercontinental range. . . [One technique] is to put it on a ship, peel back the cover, use a transporter-erector-launcher, and fire it from a distance shorter than ICBM range. . . a rogue state has done that." He declined to identify which specific country, but said, "Certainly you would include in that category North Korea and Iraq and Iran and Libya. . ."

This threat exists today. And more threats of longer range are surely coming.

We dare not continue to tarry. We need to be free of the ABM Treaty now — and to build the most effective defenses we can, as soon as possible. The only question at the President's ranch in Crawford, Texas should be whether Russia will join us in building global defenses to protect Americans and others around the world.

But the ABM Treaty must go now.

**Tuesday October 30 7:04 AM ET**

## **Officials Wary About Soviet Arsenal**

*By SHARON THEIMER, Associated Press Writer*

WASHINGTON (AP) - The United States has spent as much as \$5 billion since 1991 to help secure the former Soviet Union's vast nuclear, chemical and biological arsenal, but U.S. officials say they still can't account for all the weapons.

Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the United States should be very concerned that some of these Soviet weapons of mass destruction may have slipped into the wrong hands, said Sen. Dick Lugar, R-Ind.

``That is the worst-case scenario," he said. ``That is the one thing we must make certain did not happen."

Lugar co-authored legislation a decade ago that launched the U.S. effort to safeguard the Soviet arsenal during the political, economic and social chaos that surrounded the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since then, he said, roughly half the Soviet nuclear warheads have been destroyed.

The secure disposal of the materials that those weapons use for nuclear explosions - plutonium and highly enriched uranium - is still difficult, he said, and the progress of securing the chemical and biological stockpiles has proceeded far more slowly than the destruction program.

The United States has upgraded security systems that cover about one-third of the almost 700 tons of weapons-grade nuclear material identified as at risk of theft or diversion from Russia, according to the General Accounting Office ([news - web sites](#)), the investigative arm of Congress.

Restrictions imposed by Russia have kept the U.S. Department of Energy ([news - web sites](#)) from installing security systems at about 100 buildings that contain hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material, according to a February GAO report. The report cites a wide-open gate at one Russian nuclear facility.

Ken Alibek, a former top scientist in the Soviet biological weapons program who came to the United States in 1992, said economically struggling Soviet weapons scientists pose the greatest threat.

Finding raw materials for biological weapons is easy because each country has its own pathogenic microorganisms, Alibek said, but such materials are worthless without the ability to transform them into weapons.

“In the field of biological weapons, the real threat is knowledge,” he said.

The State and Defense departments have programs to put Soviet weapons scientists to work on beneficial research to reduce the risk they will be recruited by terrorists or smaller nations out to develop mass-destruction armaments.

Alibek said the money from those programs doesn't always go to the right people in the biological weapons area. Hundreds of bioweapons scientists have received not a penny.

In addition, he said, security remains lax at some Soviet facilities that work with deadly biological agents.

Chris Kessler, spokesman for the State Department's nonproliferation bureau, said the agency “has no reason to believe that Russia or any Central Asian country has been the source of anthrax or any other pathogen” used in the mail attacks in the United States. He declined to elaborate, citing the ongoing investigation.

Former Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said U.S. programs to support Soviet weapons scientists are a good start but are insufficient given the magnitude of the problem. An international effort is needed, he said.

“Now, hopefully, the warming of relationships between the U.S. and Russia will enhance cooperation,” he said,

“but you still cannot prevent a hungry Russian scientist who cares about feeding his family from defecting for the right price to Iraq, Iran, North Korea ([news - web sites](#)) or even” Osama bin Laden ([news - web sites](#)).

Former Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., who authored the Soviet nonproliferation legislation with Lugar, said Americans are safer than they were during the 40 to 50 years that the threat of a Cold War-driven nuclear holocaust hung over their heads.

Still, he said, the United States cannot be sure some weapons and expertise have not leaked out of the former Soviet Union.

“We'll never be sure, and we'll never be absolutely safe,” said Nunn, who now heads the Nuclear Threat Initiative foundation.

[http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20011030/wl/attacks\\_soviet\\_arsenal\\_2.html](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20011030/wl/attacks_soviet_arsenal_2.html)

## Russian parliament votes on destruction of chemical weapons

BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Oct 31, 2001

Text of report by Radio Russia on 31 October

The State Duma has voted that the destruction of chemical weapons may be performed not only in those locations where they are stored, but in other regions in Russia. The relevant amendment to the law on the destruction of chemical weapons passed its third and final reading today.

This addition to the law allows for the transportation of chemical weapons on special road vehicles, or by rail from the storage installations to destruction sites. The amendments also envisage that the locations of installations for the destruction of chemical weapons be agreed with the state authorities in the relevant constituent part of the Russian Federation, and local government bodies. The route for the transportation of the materials must also be agreed.

The law that has been passed by the Duma will be sent for ratification to the Federation Council.

Source: Radio Russia, Moscow, in Russian 1100 gmt 31 Oct 01

<http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=011031005801&query=chemical+weapons>

# Drugmakers Step Forward in Bioterror Fight

Free, Discounted Pills Offered

By Justin Gillis

Washington Post Staff Writer

Wednesday, October 31, 2001; Page A18

After a slow start in helping the government tackle bioterrorism, the nation's drug companies are coming forward with a series of offers that include free drugs, logistical aid, help making vaccines and the deployment of scientific teams to work at the government's behest.

At least five companies are offering the government free supplies of drugs believed effective in treating anthrax, with one company pledging as many as 100 million pills at no cost, and several others saying they will supply their drugs at no profit.

At least four companies have pledged to help the government make good on its promise to stockpile enough smallpox vaccine for every American by the end of next year.

Drug companies are planning to outline these and other proposals today in a meeting with Tom Ridge, the federal director of homeland security. They are already negotiating arrangements with the Department of Health and Human Services. A trade group, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, said yesterday that it had appointed a respected public health veteran, Michael Friedman, to coordinate the industry's efforts.

Alan Holmer, president of PhRMA, said he sensed an "overwhelming desire" among pharmaceutical executives to help the country through its struggle with terrorism. He recalled the role these companies played in World War II, when they set up crash programs to provide drugs such as penicillin to soldiers at the front.

"We're Americans first," Holmer said. "The American pharmaceutical companies have been there in the past for the country in times of national crisis."

Academic experts who follow the industry, while not doubting that companies genuinely want to help, also perceive a public relations opportunity for the giant pharmaceutical firms, their reputations battered in recent years by controversy over drug prices and the unavailability of AIDS treatments in poor countries.

"There's an opportunity for the industry, which I think has got a very tarnished image these days in the public's eye, to appear sensitive" to bioterrorism fears, said Kenneth Kaitin, director of the Center for the Study of Drug Development at Tufts University in Boston. "If ever there were a need for showing good faith and a willingness to be involved at a very tense time, this is it."

Holmer did not dispute the point. "I've always felt that the best public relations is to do the right thing, and then get caught doing it," he said.

Many of the industry offers have come in the past week. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. of New York, for instance, said it will "fully fund" a team of 20 to 25 scientists with expertise in bacterial research to help the government mount "a multi-prong attack on the microbial weapons of bioterrorism."

Other drug companies are pledging employees to help the government as well. The companies declined to say how much all this will cost, but a small biotechnology company fielding a team of 20 to 25 scientists would typically spend several million dollars a year.

Five companies, meanwhile, have promised the government free supplies of seven antibiotics known or believed to be useful in treating anthrax. In addition to Bristol-Myers Squibb, the companies are Abbott Laboratories, GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Johnson & Johnson and Pharmacia Corp.

All the antibiotics in question are established, licensed products, but three are not specifically approved by the Food and Drug Administration to treat anthrax. The disease has been so rare in Western countries in recent decades that companies had little incentive or opportunity to test their products against anthrax in human patients. In all three cases, however, the drugs have been shown in laboratory tests to work against the anthrax germ, *Bacillus anthracis*. Two of the antibiotics, Bristol-Myers Squibb's Tequin and Johnson & Johnson's Levaquin, belong to the same chemical family as Cipro, an anti-anthrax drug made by Bayer AG that has been the focus of public attention and hoarding. The companies said they would make supplies of Tequin and Levaquin available to the government for free if the FDA approves their use against anthrax.

Separately, Bayer has negotiated a deal to supply the government with Cipro at a "greatly reduced" price of 95 cents or less per tablet. Bayer has been caught up in a controversy over whether the government should override its patent on Cipro and order the drug from other companies to ensure adequate supply. Efforts by the industry to supply the

government with a large stockpile of drugs could dampen that dispute and ensure that the patent system, on which drug companies say they depend, remains intact.

Johnson & Johnson pledged to supply as many as 100 million tablets of Levaquin for free, while Bristol-Myers Squibb set no limit on its pledge. Levaquin sells at wholesale for about \$8 per tablet and Tequin for \$6.82 per tablet. In the "unlikely event" that demand were to exceed supply, Bristol-Myers Squibb said, it would grant its patent rights to other companies so they could help make the drug.

Kaitin, the Tufts expert, saw a potential benefit to the companies beyond the public relations value of the move. In circumstances where testing a previously approved antibiotic against a particular disease is not possible because the ailment is so rare, Kaitin said, companies might benefit from new FDA precedents that laboratory tests alone are sufficient to include that disease on the drug's label.

He noted the FDA must constantly balance public access to potentially helpful drugs against the risks those drugs pose. "Anything that moves the balance toward access versus caution works to the industry's benefit," Kaitin said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14503-2001Oct30.html>

## **Austria Tests Possible Anthrax Disinfectant Spray**

October 31, 2001 10:53 AM ET

VIENNA (Reuters) - Austrian scientists said on Wednesday they were testing a disinfectant spray that killed anthrax spores on contact and could be used to prevent human infection from the deadly disease.

Scientists from Vienna's General Hospital tested the spray on envelopes contaminated with anthrax powder and found it destroyed the spores within seconds and remained effective for at least half an hour.

The spray could be used as a quick means of disinfecting suspicious parcels and packages or buildings which have been subjected to germ attacks, Apostolos Georgopoulos, a microbiologist at the hospital told the state broadcaster ORF.

"In test conditions we put dried and powdered anthrax spores in envelopes and then sprayed them with the substance," Georgopoulos was quoted as saying on the ORF's Web site.

"Initial results show these spores are exterminated by the new product."

Georgopoulos added that as the substance is non-toxic and has no side-effects it could be used freely as a prophylactic against human infection from the disease.

He emphasized that it was not an antibiotic or a treatment for anthrax infection but simply a disinfectant which killed the bacteria before they could be inhaled or touched by humans.

In recent weeks, post offices and businesses in many countries have been hit by anthrax scares, while three people have died from inhalation anthrax in the United States.

But Austrian authorities said the chemical, which was originally designed for use in the oil industry, still had to undergo further trials to see if it was effective, adding it had not yet been granted a medical license.

"The initial tests have produced some promising results," Secretary of State for Health Reinhart Waneck said in a statement. "But there is not yet any conclusive proof of its efficacy."

"We all hope that our claims are confirmed and that a substance which effectively combats anthrax bacteria will be found," he added. "But we will have to wait a while for confirmation."

Waneck did not disclose the chemical composition of the disinfectant or the company manufacturing it.

[http://www.reuters.com/news\\_article.jhtml?type=sciennews&StoryID=335970](http://www.reuters.com/news_article.jhtml?type=sciennews&StoryID=335970)

Wednesday October 31 2:48 PM ET

## **New York City Hospital Worker Dies**

By JIM FITZGERALD, Associated Press Writer

NEW YORK (AP) - A hospital worker with a mysterious case of inhalation anthrax died early Wednesday, the nation's fourth fatality in a month of bioterrorism.

Kathy T. Nguyen, 61, died three days after checking herself into Lenox Hill Hospital and being diagnosed as New York City's first case of the inhaled form of the disease.

Also Wednesday, a post office spokesman said an employee at a second regional mail facility in New Jersey was suspected to have skin anthrax, and White House spokesman Ari Fleischer ([news - web sites](#)) said a co-worker of Nguyen has a suspicious lesion that has been tested. There are no results yet, he said at the White House.

"Somebody is trying to kill the American people by sending anthrax through the mail," Fleischer said. "The president believes the actions of the government have saved lives. He regrets that these attacks have resulted in the loss of anybody's life."

Nguyen's illness, and that of a New Jersey accountant who contracted the less serious skin anthrax, complicated the investigation by raising new worries that tainted letters are contaminating other mail or that the spores are sickening people by means other than the mail.

Dr. Anthony Fauci of the National Institutes of Health ([news - web sites](#)) said worries about "cross-contamination" - anthrax spores sticking to pieces of mail at postal facilities - have grown with the new cases.

"We really need to do - the public health officials, the forensic group - has to do a real full court press on trying to track this down. This is critical," he said on NBC's "Today" show.

The inspector in charge of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service's main forensic laboratory told The Associated Press Wednesday that investigators were confident there have been only three anthrax-tainted letters sent through the mail, despite concerns from medical experts that not all envelopes containing anthrax had been found.

"I still think we're dealing with three letters," said Roy W. Geffen, who runs the lab in suburban Virginia. "That's the best information we have."

In New York, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani ([news - web sites](#)) said the city is awaiting definitive test results on a telephone bill envelope received by a man in Queens. The envelope, with a brown smear, initially tested positive for anthrax but a subsequent test came back negative. The more definitive results may come back Wednesday night, Giuliani said.

The latest victims raised the number of confirmed anthrax cases to 17 nationwide since the outbreak began in early October. Ten have the inhaled form, including the four who died. The others have less-severe skin infections.

Four of those skin-anthrax cases - and two more suspected cases - are linked to city media outlets.

Nguyen, an immigrant from Vietnam who lived alone and commuted to the Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital by subway from the Bronx, worked in a basement supply room. Until recently, the space had included a mailroom, but there was no evidence of any suspicious letter.

Fleischer said preliminary tests at the hospital and at Nguyen's home were negative for anthrax. He cautioned, however, "these are preliminary negatives. There have been changes in the past" from other preliminary test results. "Clearly in the case of Mrs. Nguyen, we do not know how she contracted the anthrax," he said.

Thomas Rich, a co-worker of Nguyen, said "almost everyone in the hospital came in contact with her," because she delivered supplies to various departments and offices.

Up to 2,000 hospital workers, patients and visitors who have been to the hospital since Oct. 11 are being offered antibiotics, officials said Tuesday. The hospital was closed and other hospitals in the city were alerted to take precautions and report any suspicions.

Nguyen had been too sick to help the health and criminal investigators trying to find the source of her infection by reconstructing her social life, commute and routines at the hospital.

Word of Nguyen's death came with the nation already on highest alert after warnings of more potential terrorist attacks. Just a few miles away from where Nguyen worked, President Bush ([news - web sites](#)) threw out the opening pitch in Game 3 of the World Series at Yankee Stadium, where fans encountered especially tight security.

On Wednesday, the outbreak came up at a White House meeting between Bush and congressional leaders of both parties. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle said afterward that Congress is committed to improving the nation's ability to respond to bioterrorism attacks.

"There's a lot there that has to be addressed," he said, pointing to the need to boost the availability of vaccines, improve health care responses and protect the nation's food supply.

The spread of the disease - from mail carriers in New Jersey and Washington to media employees in New York and Florida and now apparently unrelated people - is giving investigators and researchers alike a painful real-world case study.

Contamination of postal facilities in Washington, New Jersey and Florida has altered investigators' assumptions about how easily the spores can be spread. Postal Service equipment and procedures, too, are under re-examination. The latest suspected case of skin anthrax in New Jersey came in an employee at the Bellmawr regional mail facility, about 35 miles from the mail-sorting center near Trenton, N.J., that processed at least three anthrax-tainted letters sent to Daschle's office in Washington, NBC anchorman Tom Brokaw and the New York Post.



Officials investigating the infection of a New Jersey accountant were searching for a link to earlier cases. The 51-year-old accountant identified with skin anthrax on Monday does not remember opening any suspicious mail. She has been successfully treated and released from the hospital.

FBI ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) Agent James Jarboe acknowledged Tuesday that the agency had not yet tested quarantined mail on Capitol Hill for possible cross-contamination with anthrax from the Daschle letter. Lawmakers from both parties criticized the bureau after hearing Jarboe's testimony.

But Daschle praised health care and law enforcement officials for their response to the discovery of anthrax in a letter sent to his office.

"We all recognize that given what we've seen in the last several days that left unattended this situation in the Senate could have been a lot worse," Daschle said Wednesday.

Experts at the Postal Inspection Service lab who specialize in handwriting and fingerprint analysis have been helping the FBI trace the letters. Postal inspectors have arrested 16 people across the country in anthrax-hoax cases, and they're investigating about a dozen others, Geffen said.

Health officials have offered assurances that relatively large numbers of spores are needed for an inhalation infection, citing one report that estimated 8,000 to 10,000 must be inhaled. Another study estimated as few as 2,500.

"We're learning as each day goes by something about this, but unfortunately we just don't have an experience that can offer a clear-cut line," said Dr. Bradley Perkins, a CDC anthrax expert.

Rep. Mike Pence ([news](#) - [bio](#) - [voting record](#)), R-Ind., said he was told by investigators that the letter sent to Daschle's office carried about 2 grams of anthrax, or just less than a teaspoon. If the 2 grams were pure anthrax, it would contain enough spores to sicken about 2 million people, said Dr. David Sullivan, an anthrax expert at Johns Hopkins University.

The Food and Drug Administration ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) issued a notice Wednesday to clarify that the antibiotics doxycycline and penicillin are approved along with Cipro for use in treating all forms of anthrax infections. The notice in the Federal Register also includes explicit dosing information to treat inhalational anthrax in adults and children.

In Washington, the postmaster general said several billion dollars are needed to safeguard the nation's mail. Anthrax has killed two postal workers there, and officials closed two more post offices while planning a two-week decontamination of a Senate office building where the bacteria were found.

[http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20011031/us/attacks\\_anthrax\\_135.html](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20011031/us/attacks_anthrax_135.html)